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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Craig Alan Finley was convicted in the U.S. District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania of production, 
receipt, distribution, and possession of material depicting the 
sexual exploitation of a minor.  Finley appeals from the 
District Court’s judgment of conviction and sentence of 50 
 3 
years’ imprisonment followed by a life term of supervised 
release.  For the following reasons, we will affirm. 
I. 
A. 
The events leading to Finley’s indictment and 
conviction began in 2010 when FBI Agents Marc Botello of 
Los Angeles, California and Barry Couch of Rochester, New 
York commenced independent undercover investigations 
using GigaTribe, a peer-to-peer online file-sharing program.  
The agents performed “takeovers” of third party accounts, 
which allowed them to share files and engage in chats with 
other users.  A user with the screen name Boys4me2010 
allowed the agents to access his files, including a number of 
videos and images that contained child pornography.  On one 
occasion, after Boys4me2010 implied that he was sexually 
involved with a child, Agent Couch asked for the child’s 
name, and Boys4me2010 gave it.  Agent Couch then 
identified one of Boys4me2010’s folders that was titled with 
the child’s name and contained images of a young boy.  
Thereafter, the agents independently identified 
Boys4me2010’s Internet Protocol (“IP”) address, traced the 
IP address to its provider, Armstrong Cable Services, in 
Butler, Pennsylvania, and subpoenaed the company for 
information pertaining to the owner of the IP address.  
Armstrong responded in each instance that the IP address 
belonged to Craig Finley of Titusville, Pennsylvania. 
Agent Michael Shaffer of the Erie, Pennsylvania FBI 
office became involved in the investigation after receiving 
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leads from Agents Botello and Couch.  On December 23, 
2010, Agent Shaffer executed a search warrant for Finley’s 
apartment, and although he found no one inside, he did find a 
running computer.  In order to wake the computer, Agent 
Shaffer moved its mouse, which allowed him to identify a 
GigaTribe account with the screen name Boys4me2010.  He 
saw images that Boys4me2010 was sharing, including an 
image of the torso of a boy who was sitting on a green couch.  
Agent Shaffer saw the same couch in Finley’s apartment. 
Pennsylvania State Police Corporal Robert Pearson, a 
federally deputized law enforcement officer who is an expert 
in computer forensics, conducted examinations of two 
computers that were seized from Finley’s apartment.  The 
computers contained Finley’s resume, a link to Finley’s 
Facebook page, and a GigaTribe account for Boys4me2010, 
along with explicit examples of sharing, distributing, and 
receiving child pornography.  Corporal Pearson estimated that 
Boys4me2010 had engaged in conversations about sharing, 
distributing, and receiving child pornography with hundreds 
of GigaTribe users.  He also estimated that there were 
approximately 30,000 videos and images of child 
pornography on the two computers. 
B. 
On July 12, 2011, a grand jury indicted Finley on a 
four-count superseding indictment:  Count One, production of 
material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), (e); Count Two, receipt of 
material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1); Count Three, 
 5 
distribution of material depicting the sexual exploitation of a 
minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), (b)(1); and 
Count Four, possession of material depicting the sexual 
exploitation of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2). 
 Finley pled not guilty and went to trial.  Before the 
jury was selected, defense counsel offered to stipulate that the 
videos and images obtained from the computers in Finley’s 
apartment were in fact child pornography (i.e., material 
depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor) on the condition 
that the government would not show the videos and images to 
the jury.  The government refused on the basis “that a 
Defendant cannot stipulate away the Government’s 
evidence,” and the District Court ruled that the government 
was not required to accept the offer.  App. at 62-63. 
 The District Court informed the potential jurors that 
they might be shown graphic images of child pornography: 
“There will likely be explicit language and 
photographs in this case which will depict 
children involved in sexually explicit activities.  
I will tell you, give you a couple of examples.  
You will likely see pictures and movies of 
young boys performing oral sex on adult males 
or other young boys.  You will also likely see 
pictures and movies of adult men performing 
anal sex on young boys.  You will also likely 
see pictures and movies of young boys 
engaging in anal sex. 
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The question is, I understand that it may be 
difficult for you to hear such language or view 
these pictures; however, due to the nature of the 
case some exposure to this material will be 
necessary.  It is important that you be able to set 
aside any personal feelings you may have about 
the material that you see and fairly consider the 
evidence to consider whether this Defendant is 
guilty of any of the charges. 
Will the mere subject matter of this case affect 
your ability – the ability of any of you to listen 
and later fairly discuss the evidence with other 
jurors and act as a fair and impartial juror?” 
Id. at 115-16.  One juror was excused following this question. 
 Despite the District Court’s ruling that the government 
was not required to accept defense counsel’s offer to stipulate 
to the content of the videos and images, defense counsel made 
the following remarks in his opening statement: 
“I will tell you right now the images that are 
being distributed and received through the 
GigaTribe program on these computers, they’re 
images of child pornography.  They are minors 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct . . . . 
So if the prosecutor chooses to still show them 
to you, even though we are not disputing that 
fact, he has the right to show them if he 
chooses, but I am telling you we’re not 
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disputing it.  I will stand up in my closing 
argument and tell you that the images are 
images of minors engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.  If they still choose to show the images 
to you, they’re doing it in the hopes that you 
will be so horrified you will stop thinking and 
you will be so horrified you will want to convict 
somebody because you will be so angry at what 
you see.  Then the person they’re going to 
parade in front of you is Craig [Finley].” 
Id. at 199-200. 
Before Agent Botello testified, defense counsel 
objected to four videos that the government intended to show 
to the jury.  Specifically, defense counsel argued that their 
admission was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  The District Court, after viewing 
the content of the videos, allowed their admission, stating: 
“Well, I am not going to try to describe them 
other than to say in each case there are 
individuals on the screen committing oral 
sodomy, and I think it’s part of this prosecution 
so I am going to let them in.” 
Id. at 207.  Defense counsel then stated that the District Court 
still had to balance the probative value and prejudicial effect 
of the videos under Rule 403.  The District Court responded:  
“Right.  And I think that the probative value outweighs the 
possible prejudice.”  Id.  The four videos were then shown to 
the jury.  Id. at 260-62; Gov’t Exs. 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D. 
 8 
Again, before Agent Couch testified, defense counsel 
objected to nine videos and two images that the government 
intended to show to the jury.  The District Court, after 
viewing the videos and the images, allowed their admission, 
stating: 
“I don’t think it is necessary for me to put on 
the record what I think I have just seen.  The 
pictures will speak for themselves.  But I 
understand where [defense counsel] is coming 
from and I would simply say that they are I 
think relevant to the entire prosecution here and 
on balance the possible prejudice is outweighed 
by the probative value.” 
Id. at 277.  The nine videos and two images were then shown 
to the jury.  Id. at 326-32; Gov’t Exs. 4B, 4C, 4D, 4E, 4F, 4G, 
4H, 4I, 4J, 4K (image), 4L (image). 
Finally, during the testimony of Corporal Pearson, 
defense counsel renewed his objection to the showing of more 
child pornography.  He argued that the jury had reached a 
“saturation point.”  App. at 479.  The District Court stated 
that the “[r]uling is the same.”  Id.  At one point thereafter, 
the government acknowledged that at least several members 
of the jury “were visibly and openly crying” after seeing 
“[p]ictures of six-, seven-, eight-year-old boys being anally 
raped and crying while it occurs.”  Id. at 867. 
 During the charge conference, defense counsel, with 
regard to Count One, objected to the government’s proposed 
jury instruction that “[e]ven a sleeping child can engage in 
 9 
sexually explicit conduct when, for example, another person 
uses the child to create sexually explicit conduct.”  Id. at 542-
43.  The District Court allowed the instruction, but stated, “I 
think I am going to modify it and say:  Even a sleeping child 
can be said to have engaged.”  Id. at 543.  After the 
government rested its case, defense counsel made a motion 
for judgment of acquittal on Count One under Rule 29 of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and argued that as a 
matter of law a sleeping child cannot “engage in” sexually 
explicit conduct.  The government’s evidence with regard to 
Count One showed that the child at issue was asleep at the 
time of the events in question.  The District Court denied the 
motion, stating: 
“Well, I think we discussed that briefly in 
chambers on the record, but I think under all the 
circumstances while they are not explicitly 
engaged in what we might think of as the 
common terminology, I think here what they’re 
talking about is there was explicit contact with 
him; and even though he didn’t participate, 
because he was asleep, I think under the legal 
definition he did engage in sexual activity . . . . 
So we will deny the motion.” 
Id. at 676.  The District Court, in its charge to the jury, stated: 
“Even a sleeping child can be said to have been 
engaged in sexually explicit conduct when, for 
example, another person uses the child to create 
the sexually explicit conduct.” 
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Id. at 790.  After the District Court charged the jury, defense 
counsel renewed his objection, and the District Court declined 
to change its position.  On January 26, 2012, the jury returned 
a verdict of guilty on all four counts. 
 The counts on which Finley was convicted came with 
statutory maximums:  30 years for Count One; 20 years for 
Count Two; 20 years for Count Three; and 10 years for Count 
Four.  According to the Probation Office’s Presentence 
Report (“PSR”), no sentence could be imposed at Count Four 
because it was a lesser included offense of Count Two.  Also, 
the PSR noted that, based on Finley’s total offense level and 
criminal history, the advisory Sentencing Guidelines called 
for life imprisonment.  Because the sentence on the count 
carrying the highest statutory maximum (i.e., Count One at 30 
years) was less than life imprisonment, the PSR advised that 
the sentence imposed on one or more of the other counts 
“shall run consecutively, but only to the extent necessary to 
produce a combined sentence equal to the total punishment.”  
PSR ¶ 63 (citing U.S.S.G § 5G1.2(d)). 
 Finley objected to the PSR by arguing that the 
violations under Counts Two and Three for receipt and 
distribution of material depicting the sexual exploitation of a 
minor were violations of the same statutory provision, 18 
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), and constituted alternative ways of 
proving the same offense.  Finley thus asserted that 
consecutive punishments on these counts would violate the 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  From this, 
Finley contended that his statutory maximum was 50 years, 
but that a sentence of 30 years would be sufficient.  The 
government disagreed and argued that Finley’s statutory 
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maximum should be 70 years, as a result of running the 
sentences at Counts One, Two, and Three consecutively.  The 
government then asked for the maximum sentence.  The 
District Court addressed Finley’s objection and concluded 
that separate punishments would not violate the Double 
Jeopardy Clause in Finley’s case.  The District Court 
explained: 
“[T]he evidence established that the Defendant 
at a minimum distributed the images he 
produced in Count One separate and apart from 
images he received in Count Two.  The 
evidence at trial also established that the 
Defendant received images that he did not 
possess and distributed different images that he 
already possessed.  We agree with the 
government that the nature of the peer to peer 
network and this particular Defendant’s conduct 
in trading images establishes that the charges of 
receipt and distribution are not identical.” 
App. at 11.  The District Court thus agreed with the 
government that the statutory maximum was 70 years.  At the 
May 8, 2012 sentencing hearing, the District Court sentenced 
Finley to a 30-year term of imprisonment at Count One, to be 
served consecutively with a 20-year term of imprisonment at 
Count Two.  The District Court also imposed a 20-year term 
of imprisonment at Count Three to be served concurrently 
with the terms of imprisonment at Counts One and Two.  The 
District Court did not impose a term of imprisonment at 
Count Four.  This resulted in a total term of imprisonment of 
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50 years, plus a life term of supervised release.  Finley then 
filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
III. 
A. 
Finley contends that the District Court committed 
procedural and substantive errors at trial with respect to Rule 
403, which provides that “[t]he court may exclude relevant 
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
a danger of one or more of the following:  unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, 
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.”  
A district court is generally afforded broad discretion on 
evidentiary rulings due to its “familiarity with the details of 
the case and its greater experience in evidentiary matters.”  
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co. v. Mendelsohn, 552 U.S. 379, 384 
(2008).  “This is particularly true with respect to Rule 403 
since it requires an on-the-spot balancing of probative value 
and prejudice, potentially to exclude as unduly prejudicial 
some evidence that already has been found to be factually 
relevant.”  Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
Under this deferential standard, if it is clear that the district 
court did in fact conduct a Rule 403 analysis, then we will 
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uphold the ruling “unless the district court has abused its 
discretion.”  See id. 
1. 
Finley asserts that the District Court committed a 
procedural error by not balancing the Rule 403 factors on the 
record, and that as a result, we must remand.  We have 
previously stated that “[w]hen a court engages in a Rule 403 
balancing and articulates on the record a rational explanation, 
we will rarely disturb its ruling.  Where, however, the court 
fail[s] to perform this analysis, or where its rationale is not 
apparent from the record, there is no way to review its 
discretion.”  United States v. Sampson, 980 F.2d 883, 889 (3d 
Cir. 1992) (internal citation omitted); see also Gov’t of the 
V.I. v. Pinney, 967 F.2d 912, 917-18 (3d Cir. 1992).  In 
Sampson and Pinney, we found procedural errors where 
district courts failed to mention anything about probative 
value or prejudice surrounding particular evidence.  Sampson, 
980 F.2d at 889; Pinney, 967 F.2d at 917-18.  Thus, in these 
cases, we were unable to conclude that the district court 
actually conducted a Rule 403 analysis. 
Here, after viewing the first four videos that the 
government sought to admit, the District Court acknowledged 
that there were “individuals on the screen committing oral 
sodomy,” and further stated that “I think it’s part of this 
prosecution so I am going to let them in.”  App. at 207.  After 
defense counsel objected that the court was required to 
balance the probative value and prejudicial effect of the 
videos, the District Court stated, “Right.  And I think that the 
probative value outweighs the possible prejudice.”  Id.  And, 
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after viewing another round of videos and considering 
another objection from defense counsel, the District Court 
stated, “I understand where [defense counsel] is coming from 
and I would simply say that they are I think relevant to the 
entire prosecution here and on balance the possible prejudice 
is outweighed by the probative value.”  Id. at 277.  Although 
a more detailed explanation from the District Court would 
have been helpful, we hold that the District Court’s 
statements were sufficient to satisfy the procedural 
requirements of Rule 403.  Unlike in Sampson and Pinney, 
we are able to see that the District Court conducted a Rule 
403 analysis, in which it simply concluded that probative 
value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. 
2. 
Finley also puts forth two rationales as to why the 
District Court committed a substantive violation of Rule 403.  
Because defense counsel offered to stipulate to the fact that 
the videos and images contained child pornography, Finley 
asserts that the videos and images were of no probative value, 
and thus, should not have been admitted.  In the alternative, 
Finley asserts that the District Court erred in declining to 
exclude the very worst of the videos and images, and that its 
decision to admit the videos and images conflicts with this 
Court’s precedent in United States v. Cunningham, 694 F.3d 
372 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 With respect to the offered stipulation, the government 
is entitled to prove its case free from a defendant’s preference 
to stipulate the evidence away.  Old Chief v. United States, 
519 U.S. 172, 189 (1997).  As the Supreme Court remarked in 
 15 
Old Chief, “[a] syllogism is not a story, and a naked 
proposition in a courtroom may be no match for the robust 
evidence that would be used to prove it.”  Id.  The 
government is thus entitled to put forward the relevant 
evidence that it chooses.  Cunningham, 694 F.3d at 388.  
However, that evidence remains subject to Rule 403, id., and 
the existence of a stipulation is a relevant factor in the Rule 
403 balancing process.  Id. at 386 n.23. 
 The government contends that because Finley’s 
counsel merely offered to stipulate, and did not actually 
stipulate, the government still had to prove that Finley 
produced, received, distributed, and possessed material that 
met the legal definition of child pornography, and thus the 
videos and images were of great probative value.  This 
contention, however, is without merit.  Although we have yet 
to explicitly address whether the distinction between an offer 
to stipulate and an actual stipulation is pertinent for purposes 
of Rule 403, we have implicitly concluded that it is not.  See 
id. at 391 (“[C]ourts are in near-uniform agreement that the 
admission of child pornography images or videos is 
appropriate, even where the defendant has stipulated, or 
offered to stipulate, that those images or videos contained 
child pornography.”) (emphasis added).  Furthermore, our 
sister courts of appeals have, on numerous occasions, treated 
an offer to stipulate the same as an actual stipulation for 
purposes of analyzing the admissibility of child pornography 
under Rule 403.  See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 564 
F.3d 142, 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2009); United States v. Schene, 
543 F.3d 627, 642-43 (10th Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Ganoe, 538 F.3d 1117, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2008); United States 
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v. Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d 115, 120 (1st Cir. 2008); 
United States v. Sewell, 457 F.3d 841, 843-44 (8th Cir. 2006).  
Thus, the fact that defense counsel merely offered to stipulate 
instead of actually stipulating is of no consequence in this 
case. 
 The government’s stronger contention as to the 
probative value of the videos and images is that they were 
necessary to show that Finley knowingly received, distributed, 
and possessed child pornography.  Knowledge was an 
element of each of the crimes for which Finley was charged at 
Counts Two, Three, and Four.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a).  
Finley counters that the videos and images were not probative 
of a relevant fact because knowledge was never an issue; i.e., 
he never argued that he received, distributed, or possessed 
child pornography without knowing the subject matter with 
which he was dealing; instead, he argued that he was not the 
one responsible because someone else gained access to his 
computer.  Finley’s counter-argument is misplaced.  “[T]he 
prosecution’s burden to prove every element of the crime is 
not relieved by a defendant’s tactical decision not to contest 
an essential element of the offense.”  Estelle v. McGuire, 502 
U.S. 62, 69 (1991).  In Cunningham, for example, the 
defendant asserted a similar defense with a similar stipulation, 
and before we ultimately determined that the District Court 
had committed a procedural error by not viewing the videos 
beforehand, we stated that “[e]ven with the parties’ 
stipulation, we recognize that showing the video excerpts here 
had some probative value because they had a tendency to 
show that the offender knew the videos contain[ed] child 
pornography.”  694 F.3d at 389 (emphasis added); see also 
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Morales-Aldahondo, 524 F.3d at 120 (admitting images even 
though the defendant offered to stipulate that the images 
contained child pornography and the defendant did not 
contest the knowledge element of the crime).  Thus, even 
with the stipulation, the videos and images were probative of 
a material fact. 
 Finley argues in the alternative that the District Court’s 
decision to admit the worst of the videos and images conflicts 
with our Cunningham precedent.  In Cunningham, a district 
court judge permitted videos to be shown to the jury without 
first viewing the videos to determine whether the danger of 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the probative value 
of the videos under Rule 403.  During Cunningham’s trial, the 
government played two separate videos for the jury 
containing a total of seven video excerpts.  The most 
disturbing of the video excerpts depicted bondage and other 
sadistic conduct against prepubescent children.  694 F.3d at 
381-82, 390-91.  The jury convicted Cunningham on all 
counts.  We concluded that the district court committed a 
procedural error by not viewing the videos prior to admitting 
them into evidence, and that because of this procedural error, 
the district court’s “underlying Rule 403 determination [was] 
not entitled to the full range of deference that we would 
normally give to it on appeal.”  Id. at 388.  Consequently, we 
conducted our own Rule 403 analysis and held that, with 
regard to the most disturbing of the videos shown to the jury, 
“the potential prejudice to the defendant substantially 
outweighed any probative value that they might have.”  Id. at 
391.  Critically, we clarified that 
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“we do not hold that the admission here of 
video excerpts or other images was per se 
improper.  Indeed courts are in near-uniform 
agreement that the admission of child 
pornography images or videos is appropriate, 
even where the defendant has stipulated, or 
offered to stipulate, that those images or videos 
contained child pornography.” 
Id. 
 Finley’s case differs significantly from Cunningham in 
at least one way:  at Finley’s trial, the District Court viewed 
the videos and images prior to admitting them into evidence.  
App. at 205-07, 276-77.  Thus, unlike in Cunningham, the 
District Court’s ruling warrants full abuse-of-discretion 
deference.  After viewing the first set of videos, the District 
Court stated: 
“Well, I am not going to try to describe them 
other than to say in each case there are 
individuals on the screen committing oral 
sodomy, and I think it’s part of this prosecution 
so I am going to let them in . . . . I think that the 
probative value outweighs the possible 
prejudice.” 
Id. at 207.  And, after viewing the second set of videos and 
images, the District Court stated: 
“I don’t think it is necessary for me to put on 
the record what I think I have just seen.  The 
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pictures will speak for themselves.  But I 
understand where [defense counsel] is coming 
from and I would simply say that they are I 
think relevant to the entire prosecution here and 
on balance the possible prejudice is outweighed 
by the probative value.” 
Id. at 277. 
The District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
making such a determination under Rule 403.  As analyzed 
above, the videos and images were probative of Finley’s 
knowledge that he was receiving, distributing, and possessing 
child pornography.  And, although some of the videos were 
extremely disturbing and absolutely prejudicial, their 
presentation was not unfairly prejudicial to the point where 
unfair prejudice substantially outweighed probative value. 
The government showed the jury only thirteen video 
segments and two images
1
 of what was a collection of more 
than 30,000 videos and images belonging to Boys4me2010.  
In addition, the District Court informed the potential jurors of 
the disturbing images they might see, asked the potential 
jurors if they could be fair, and even dismissed one potential 
juror who had doubts about her ability to be fair on the 
subject matter of child pornography.  See United States v. 
Dodds, 347 F.3d 893, 899 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding 
                                              
1
 It appears that two video segments lasting two 
seconds in duration may have been replayed for the jury 
during Corporal Pearson’s testimony.  See App. 478-81. 
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significant the fact that the trial court had taken pains to limit 
the danger of unfair prejudice by cautioning prospective 
jurors about the disturbing nature of the images and admitting 
only a small proportion of the images that were found in the 
defendant’s possession). 
 In sum, with respect to Rule 403, we see no basis to 
disturb the District Court’s judgment of conviction. 
B. 
 With respect to his conviction for producing material 
depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor at Count One, 
Finley asserts that the District Court erred in instructing the 
jury that a sleeping child can “engage in” sexually explicit 
conduct within the context of § 2251.  Finley’s contention 
presents an issue of statutory interpretation.  Section 2251(a) 
pertains to “[a]ny person who employs, uses, persuades, 
induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage in . . . any 
sexually explicit conduct.”  (emphasis added). 
 “The plain meaning of legislation should be 
conclusive, except in the rare cases in which the literal 
application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at 
odds with the intentions of its drafters.  In such cases, the 
intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, 
controls.”  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 
235, 242 (1989); see also Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. 
Union Planters Bank, 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (“[W]hen the 
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts – at 
least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd – 
is to enforce it according to its terms.”).  In construing a 
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provision’s plain meaning, the definition of a word in 
isolation is not necessary controlling.  Dolan v. Postal 
Service, 546 U.S. 481, 486 (2006).  Depending upon context, 
“[a] word in a statute may or may not extend to the outer 
limits of its definitional possibilities.”  Id. 
 Finley argues that § 2251(a)’s plain language cannot 
be interpreted to encompass situations involving sleeping 
children.  Finley asserts that the statute requires the minor, as 
opposed to the perpetrator, to engage in the sexually explicit 
conduct.  He also cites to multiple online dictionaries that, in 
many cases, define “engage,” when used as an intransitive 
verb or followed by the word “in,” as requiring active 
participation and involvement.
2
 
 Finley’s focus on the word “engage” is too narrow.  
Section 2251(a) pertains to a person who “employs, uses, 
persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any minor to engage 
in . . . any sexually explicit conduct.”  (emphasis added).  
Congress’s utilization of these verbs, especially “uses,” 
                                              
2
 See Appellant’s Br. at 52-53 (citing to online 
dictionaries for definitions of “engage” when used as an 
intransitive verb or followed by the word “in,” including 
www.thefreedictonary.com (“to involve oneself or become 
occupied; participate; engage in conversation”) (last visited 
July 30, 2013); www.oxforddictionaries.com (“participate or 
become involved in:  organizations engage in a variety of 
activities”) (last visited July 30, 2013); www.oed.com 
(“entangle, involve, commit, mix up”) (last visited July 30, 
2013)). 
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indicates that active involvement on the part of a minor is not 
essential for a conviction under § 2251(a).  For example, a 
perpetrator can “use” a minor to engage in sexually explicit 
conduct without the minor’s conscious or active participation. 
 Even if the plain language of the statute could be 
interpreted to support Finley’s position, the result of such an 
interpretation would be absurd and against the obvious policy 
of the statute.  In the only published opinion addressing this 
issue, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York held that “[a]s a matter both of common sense and 
public policy, the statute must be construed to protect all 
children, including those who are unaware of what they are 
doing or what they are being subjected to, whether because 
they are sleeping or under the influence of drugs or alcohol or 
simply because of their age.”  United States v. Levy, 594 F. 
Supp. 2d 427, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
3
  It would be absurd to 
suppose that Congress intended the statute to protect children 
actively involved in sexually explicit conduct, but not protect 
children who are passively involved in sexually explicit 
conduct while sleeping, when they are considerably more 
vulnerable. 
                                              
3
 Two of our sister courts of appeals, without 
specifically addressing the issue, have, in published opinions, 
affirmed convictions under § 2251(a) where the material in 
question involved sleeping children.  See United States v. 
Vowell, 516 F.3d 503 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Wolf, 
890 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1989). 
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 In sum, on the basis of statutory text, public policy, 
and persuasive case law, we hold that the District Court did 
not err by instructing the jury that a sleeping child can 
“engage in” sexually explicit conduct within the context of 
§ 2251(a). 
C. 
Lastly, Finley asserts that the District Court violated 
his protection against double jeopardy by separately 
considering, for purposes of sentencing, his convictions for 
“receiv[ing]” and “distribut[ing]” material depicting the 
sexual exploitation of a minor under § 2252(a)(2).  The 
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides:  
“[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be 
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”  This clause, among 
other things, “protects against multiple punishments for the 
same offense.”  Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 498 (1984).  
In order for multiple punishments to constitute a double 
jeopardy violation, the multiple charged offenses must be the 
same in law and in fact.  United States v. Felton, 753 F.2d 
276, 278 (3d Cir. 1985). 
 A determination of whether the multiple charged 
offenses are the same in law involves consideration of 
whether the statutory provision in question creates multiple 
offenses or only one offense that can be proven in alternative 
ways.  See United States v. Rigas, 605 F.3d 194, 207 (3d Cir. 
2010) (en banc).  In contrast, a determination as to whether 
the two charged offenses are the same in fact involves 
consideration of whether the given conduct violated the 
statute multiple times or only once.  Id. at 212.  “The Double 
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Jeopardy Clause is not implicated when multiple separate 
violations of the same provision are charged in multiple 
counts.”  United States v. Snyder, 189 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 
1999). 
 With respect to whether Finley’s convictions for 
“receiv[ing]” and “distribut[ing]” material depicting the 
sexual exploitation of a minor were the same in law, we must 
examine § 2252(a)(2), which provides as follows: 
“Any person who knowingly receives, or 
distributes, any visual depiction using any 
means or facility of interstate or foreign 
commerce . . . if the producing of such visual 
depiction involves the use of a minor engaging 
in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual 
depiction is of such conduct . . . shall be 
punished.” 
A natural reading of § 2252(a)(2) supports Finley’s 
position that the provision creates one offense in law that can 
be proven in alternative ways.  “When Congress crafts a 
statute to create distinct offenses, it typically utilizes multiple 
subsections or separates clauses with semicolons to 
enumerate separate crimes.”  Rigas, 605 F.3d at 209.  Section 
2252(a)(2), however, does not contain multiple subsections or 
separate clauses with semicolons to indicate separate crimes 
for “receiv[ing]” or “distribut[ing]” visual depictions of 
minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, and thus 
§ 2252(a)(2) does not create distinct offenses for 
“receiv[ing]” and “distribut[ing]” child pornography. 
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 This conclusion, however, does not establish a double 
jeopardy violation in this case because Finley’s separate 
convictions for “receiv[ing]” and “distribut[ing]” child 
pornography are not the same in fact.  The evidence presented 
at trial shows that this was not a situation in which all of the 
child pornography in question was received at a distinct point 
in time into a computer network to which others had shared 
access – a situation where separate sentences for receipt and 
distribution of child pornography under § 2252(a) might raise 
a double jeopardy problem.  Rather, as acknowledged by the 
District Court, “the evidence established that [Finley] at a 
minimum distributed the images he produced in Count One 
separate and apart from images he received in Count Two.  
The evidence at trial also established that [Finley] received 
images that he did not possess and distributed different 
images that he already possessed.”  App. at 11.  Thus, 
Finley’s charged offenses at Count Two (for receiving 
material depicting the sexual exploitation of a minor) and 
Count Three (for distributing material depicting the sexual 
exploitation of a minor) involved multiple violations of 
§ 2252(a)(2) and were not the same in fact. 
In sum, Finley’s separate punishments for receiving 
and distributing material depicting the sexual exploitation of a 
minor did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
IV. 
 We will affirm the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction and sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment followed 
by a life term of supervised release. 
